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In response to the severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) pandemic of 2003 and the influenza pandemic 
of 2009, many countries instituted border measures as a 
means of stopping or slowing the spread of disease. The 
measures, usually consisting of a combination of border 
entry/exit screening, quarantine, isolation, and communica-
tions, were resource intensive, and modeling and observa-
tional studies indicate that border screening is not effective 
at detecting infectious persons. Moreover, border screening 
has high opportunity costs, financially and in terms of the 
use of scarce public health staff resources during a time 
of high need. We discuss the border-screening experienc-
es with SARS and influenza and propose an approach to 
decision-making for future pandemics. We conclude that 
outbreak-associated communications for travelers at bor-
der entry points, together with effective communication with 
clinicians and more effective disease control measures in 
the community, may be a more effective approach to the 
international control of communicable diseases.
Many countries instituted border screening in response to the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 
pandemic of 2003 and the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus 
pandemic of 2009, and although not formally evaluated, 
the experiences of several countries have been document-
ed (1–11). Given the recent emergence of the influenza 
A(H7N9) virus in many parts of China (12), Middle East 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus in Saudi Arabia (13), 
and the current, most widespread Ebola outbreak in Africa 
(14), it seems timely to consider the costs and the effective-
ness of border screening, as shown by recent experiences. 
Herein, we discuss the use of border-screening measures 
instituted during the 2003 SARS pandemic and the 2009 
influenza pandemic.
Border screening, together with isolation of persons 
identified with suspected cases of disease and quarantine of 
their contacts, is implemented to delay or prevent the entry 
of infected persons to a country/geographic area or to pre-
vent the global spread of a disease from a source country. 
The intent of border screening is to detect possibly infec-
tious persons at the border, either on entry to or exit from 
a country, so that they can be placed in isolation or pre-
vented from traveling and spreading the disease elsewhere; 
however, this strategy is useful only if the intended goal 
is successfully achieved. Other potential benefits of border 
screening relate to increasing public awareness about and 
confidence in protection from the disease in question, but 
the scope of this article does not allow for a discussion of 
these benefits.
During the 2009 influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus pan-
demic, the World Health Organization advised persons who 
were ill with influenza to delay travel (15). Early during the 
SARS pandemic and in August 2014 during the Ebola virus 
epidemic, the World Health Organization recommended 
border exit screening of travelers from affected countries 
(16,17). Border screening can be undertaken through self-
identification by means of health declaration cards, airline/
transit agency notification to health authorities of sick pas-
sengers, visual inspection of travelers, and/or fever screen-
ing of travelers implemented through the use of infrared 
thermal image scanners (ITISs). Three key questions are 
the following: How effective have these measures been at 
detecting ill travelers? Are there situations in which border 
screening is likely to be effective? If border screening is 
not effective, are there any other measures that could be 
implemented to prevent the spread of disease beyond the 
source country? To explore these questions, we exam-
ined border-screening experiences during the influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus pandemic and the SARS pandemic. 
Questions relating to the effectiveness of border screening 
are relevant regardless of the situation in which they are 
applied, including limited screening from one part of the 
world or screening on isolated island countries, because the 
experiences relate to the effectiveness of the measure itself 
in detecting cases at the border.
Border Screening and the Influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09 Virus Pandemic
Because of a short incubation period and consequent short 
serial interval (i.e., time between the onset of the first case 
and the onset of subsequent case[s]), influenza virus causes 
explosive outbreaks despite its relatively low infectiv-
ity. Influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, which spread rapidly 
throughout the world in 2009, was most likely established 
in Australia (18) and Japan (19) before border screening 
was initiated in those countries. Border screening to detect 
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influenza-infected travelers is likely to be unsuccessful be-
cause persons with asymptomatic cases can be infectious, 
and fever is not a consistent symptom of influenza (20). 
This means that screening sensitivity is low and a substan-
tial proportion of infectious persons will not be detected 
at the border, and those that are detected may well have 
transmitted the virus to other persons before being iso-
lated. This was the experience of several countries during 
the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus pandemic. For ex-
ample, in Singapore, of the first 116 influenza A(H1N1)
pdm09 virus–infected persons identified with a history of 
recent international travel, only 15 (12.9%) were identi-
fied through screening at the airport (2). In Japan, intensive 
border screening was in place at the main international air-
port during April 28–June 18, 2009. Of 151 influenza cases 
that might have been acquired during travel overseas, only 
10 (6.6%) were detected as a result of border screening in 
Japan (4). During the same period in New South Wales, 
Australia, an estimated 6.7% (3/45) of imported cases were 
detected at the border (9), and in Auckland, New Zealand, 
5.8% (4/69) of the cases were detected at the airport (10). 
Singapore, Japan, and Australia, but not New Zealand, used 
ITISs to screen for fevers at their borders, even though the 
sensitivity of this screening was similarly low at the sites.
Before the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus pandemic, 
a modeling study suggested that the use of thermal scanners 
at airports/entry points to screen incoming passengers or at 
exit points from countries where influenza virus is circulat-
ing could reduce the number of cases that would otherwise 
occur during a pandemic (21). However, the study assumed 
a 50% detection rate for all incoming infected persons, in-
cluding those with asymptomatic cases and those incubat-
ing the virus (21). In practice, detection was substantially 
lower than that.
ITISs were used in many countries to detect febrile 
passengers. A review of hospital-based studies examining 
the efficacy of ITISs in detecting fever found that the sen-
sitivity of fever detection ranged from 4% to 89.6%, and 
the positive predictive value with a 1% prevalence of fever 
ranged from 3.5% to 65.4% (22). A more recent study in-
volving airline travelers estimated a positive predictive val-
ue of ITIS for fever detection of 0.9%–4.1% for detecting 
fever of any cause and a positive predictive value of fever 
for influenza of 2.0%–2.8% for detecting influenza-associ-
ated fever (3). Therefore, many persons with possible fever 
would have to be identified before a case of influenza was 
detected, and screening for fever is unlikely to be sensitive 
enough to detect sufficient numbers of influenza cases to 
prevent or slow the importation of a pandemic strain.
Several other models have assessed the role of travel 
restrictions on the international spread of influenza (23–
25). These models concluded that unless travel restrictions 
prevented >99% of travel, they would, at best, delay the 
introduction of pandemic influenza by 2–3 weeks, and be-
cause of the explosive nature of the epidemic, would have 
no overall effect on the total number of cases (23–25). The 
results are effectively the same whether travel restrictions 
are used (as in these models) or screening and isolation/
quarantine are used to limit the movement of possibly 
infectious persons. However, the conclusion from these 
models (i.e., that allowing only a small number of cases 
to enter a country would result in an epidemic of the same 
size as if travel restrictions were not in place) is applicable 
to screening. It is probable that entry screening with a low 
rate of detection of incoming cases would also be unlikely 
to significantly delay the commencement of an epidemic or 
reduce the total number of cases. The models had also not 
been validated using data from an influenza pandemic (26). 
Now that data from the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus 
pandemic are available, there is an opportunity to validate 
the models examine the efficacy of border measures.
A substantial amount of resources were expended on 
border-screening measures in several countries, including 
Australia. At a time when clinical and public health ser-
vices were stretched in responding to the pandemic, there 
were major opportunity costs resulting from the application 
of border screening (4,9). In New South Wales, it was es-
timated that the cost of staffing airport clinics was $50,000 
AUD/case detected (9).
Border Screening and the SARS Pandemic
More than 10 years have elapsed since the SARS virus 
emerged in China. From its emergence in November 2002 
through July 2003, the virus, which has an incubation pe-
riod of 2–12 days (mean 4–5), infected >8,000 persons 
across 30 countries (27). Despite the lack of antimicrobial 
drugs or a vaccine, the epidemic was controlled worldwide 
through a combination of early isolation of case-patients, 
quarantine of contacts, and strict infection control mea-
sures (20,27).
Fraser et al. (20) modeled the control of communicable 
diseases according to the diseases’ characteristics of infec-
tiousness during the incubation period and in asymptomatic 
infections. According to this model, public health measures 
are likely to be effective if persons are infectious only when 
symptomatic, particularly if infectivity peaks after the onset 
of symptoms. This means that infected persons are not infec-
tious during the incubation period or during asymptomatic 
infection. During SARS virus infection, peak viremia (and 
assumed infectivity) occurs 10 days after symptom onset 
(28), and this timing coincides with the severity of symp-
toms. Persons with asymptomatic infection and persons in 
the incubation period do not appear to be infectious (27,28). 
Therefore if case-patients are isolated within 2–3 days of 
infection, transmission will be limited (29). If contacts are 
quarantined until beyond the incubation period, this will also 
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limit further transmission. High fever (>38°C) is a common 
symptom among persons seeking medical care for SARS, 
but case-patients with fever of <38°C or who were afebrile 
have been described and have been implicated in the trans-
mission of SARS in a health care setting (30–33). This in-
formation suggests that active case finding, isolation, strict 
infection control, and contact tracing will limit the spread 
of SARS, and modeling suggests that the combination of 
these measures would be the most effective control strategy 
(20,29). This information also suggests that border measures 
that involve effective case detection (i.e., a high proportion 
of cases detected), especially if associated with opportunities 
for effective contact tracing (i.e., contacts quarantined within 
2 days of case-patient contact), could be useful strategies for 
delaying the entry of SARS into a country and limiting op-
portunities for the virus to spread. However, the long SARS 
incubation period means that cases of imported disease could 
easily occur through the border entry of infectious, asymp-
tomatic persons.
During the SARS epidemic, several countries insti-
tuted border measures, including travel warnings, educa-
tional information for travelers, and border screening. In 
Australia, Canada, and Singapore, a combination of bor-
der screening measures was instituted, yet no confirmed 
SARS cases were detected in any of the 3 countries (5–7). 
In Australia, where ITISs were not used, 4 suspected/prob-
able SARS cases were detected at the border. Those 4 cases 
represented 13.8% of the 29 persons detected in Australia 
with suspected/probable SARS during the screening period 
who were symptomatic at the time of arrival in the country 
(5). Five suspected/probable SARS case-patients arrived in 
Canada during the screening period; symptoms developed 
in all 5 patients after arrival, and none of the cases were de-
tected at the border (6). The authors concluded that because 
of the very low prevalence of infection among travelers, the 
positive predictive value of any border screening would be 
effectively zero (6).
Two independent modeling studies (29,34) modeled 
the effect of entry screening for SARS on SARS impor-
tation and subsequent spread. Glass and Becker (29) con-
cluded that entry screening for SARS would not reduce the 
probability of an outbreak of 100 cases by >7%; this con-
clusion is based on the assumption of screening effective-
ness equivalent to that estimated based on the Australian 
experience. Goubar et al. (34) also concluded that entry 
screening would play a minimal role in reducing the num-
ber of imported cases, on the basis that border screening 
would miss infected travelers who are currently incubating 
the infection (34). Both studies concluded that SARS trans-
mission within a country could be more effectively lim-
ited by gearing-up health services to enable early detection 
and isolation of case-patients than by investing in border 
screening (29,34).
To Screen or Not To Screen
We do not recommend border screening at any time during 
the evolution of an influenza pandemic because the sensitiv-
ity and specificity of influenza screening are low, regardless 
of the method (e.g., self-identification, thermal scanning, 
and/or visual inspection). Border screening is resource in-
tensive, and there is a significant opportunity cost for other 
public health measures if border screening is in place. For 
example, in Australia during May 2009 (i.e., during the in-
fluenza pandemic), an average of 28,685 persons arrived at 8 
airports via international air flights (1). Entry screening was 
in place at the time, and each screening point with an ITIS re-
quired 1–2 operators at all times when flights were arriving. 
Trained nurses were required to be present at each airport at 
all times when there were incoming flights to provide fol-
low-up for any passengers identified through ITIS screening 
or who self-identified as being unwell. An additional person 
was employed at each airport at all times when flights were 
arriving to assist with administrative activities. During April 
28, 2009–June 1, 2009, a total of 15,457 (≈1.5%) airline 
travelers arriving at airports across Australia were identified 
as being unwell. Most (84%) of these persons self-identified 
as being unwell on health declaration cards; only 0.5% were 
identified by the use of an ITIS (1). Of these 15,457 persons, 
only 154 were subsequently treated as if they were infected 
with the pandemic influenza virus.
Influenza outbreaks are difficult to control without the 
use of vaccines and antiviral drugs. The public health re-
sponse should focus on early identification and treatment 
of cases at risk of becoming severe; social-distancing mea-
sures applied at the community level; infection control 
measures; vaccination (when a vaccine becomes available); 
and in some cases, antiviral prophylaxis. Focusing on these 
measures instead of border screening will be more fruitful.
Compared with influenza, SARS is more amenable to 
border screening because fever is a more consistent symp-
tom and infected persons are not infectious when asymp-
tomatic or during the incubation period. However, persons 
who are incubating the SARS virus will not be detected by 
screening, and, given the low prevalence of infection even 
in source countries, the positive predictive value of screen-
ing will be very low. Therefore, we also do not recommend 
border screening for SARS. SARS is, however, amenable 
to control through the use of a combination of measures: 
early isolation of confirmed case-patients, quarantine of 
case-patient contacts, and strict infection control (20,27). 
Measures that will enable the early detection and isolation 
of case-patients and quarantine of contacts should be the 
focus of resource allocation.
Communication as a Border Measure
Communication with incoming travelers was a key com-
ponent of border activity during the SARS and influenza 
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A(H1N1)pdm09 virus pandemics and during other disease 
outbreaks (8,35,36). Communication can take many forms, 
including informational videos, posters, signs, in-flight an-
nouncements, flyers, and health alert notices (HANs) (36). 
During the 2009 influenza pandemic, 44% and 84% of trav-
elers identified as unwell on arrival in Singapore (2) and 
Australia (1), respectively, self-identified as being ill; this 
finding suggests that communication to incoming travel-
ers can be a useful mechanism to encourage self-reporting. 
However, the evidence of the effectiveness of communica-
tion measures at borders is limited (6,36). Travel HANS (T-
HANs) have been used in the United States by the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (Atlanta, GA) since the 
1970s as a communication tool directed to incoming trav-
elers. T-HANs provide travelers with information about a 
current disease outbreak, symptoms of the disease, and ad-
vice about seeking medical care should symptoms occur. 
T-HANs also include clinical guidance and resources for 
physicians. Selent et al. (35) evaluated the effectiveness of 
T-HANs in encouraging the self-identification and health 
care–seeking behavior of incoming travelers from Haiti 
during the cholera epidemic in that country in 2010. The 
evaluation suggested that the T-HANs provided a small 
positive influence on health care–seeking behavior among 
incoming travelers (35). The use of current communica-
tion technologies (e.g., the Internet or short text messages 
to mobile phones) could also be investigated. SMS (short 
message service) messages, for example, have been used 
successfully in other areas of public health (37).
The use of T-HANs and other communication meth-
ods is a potentially worthwhile border measure that could 
assist with the early identification and appropriate man-
agement of incoming passengers with a disease of inter-
est. Such measures need to be accompanied by the pro-
vision of appropriate health care for travelers who are 
deemed ill, and must be easily understandable. As with 
any health communication endeavor, effective commu-
nication requires multiple modes of communication and 
tailored messages (38).
Although the provision of consistent and repeated ear-
ly warnings and information about infectious disease out-
breaks to local clinicians is not a border measure, it can be 
highly effective in supporting the rapid recognition and iso-
lation of possibly infectious incoming travelers. This fact is 
exemplified by the experience of SARS in Canada, where 
alert clinicians in Vancouver, British Columbia, isolated a 
patient with SARS within 15 minutes of his/her arrival at 
the clinic and used appropriate respiratory protection, but 
clinicians in Toronto, Ontario, did not quickly isolate a 
patient with SARS or use adequate respiratory protection 
when treating the patient. Both case-patients sought care 
at a hospital on the same day during a time when signifi-
cant SARS transmission was ongoing in Ontario but not in 
Vancouver. Subsequent investigation identified well-com-
municated and repeated warnings about SARS to local 
clinicians as being an important factor in limiting further 
spread of SARS in Vancouver (39).
Conclusions
Historically, most attempts at border screening have been 
ineffectual, as demonstrated by the pandemic spread of 
SARS and influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 to many countries 
despite the use of border screening. Modeling and observa-
tional studies have indicated that border screening is likely 
to be unsuccessful in preventing or delaying the entry of 
such diseases into a country. Border screening generally 
has high opportunity costs, both financially and in terms of 
the use of scarce public health staff resources at a time of 
high need. We conclude that border screening should not 
be used. Instead, the less costly measure of providing infor-
mation to arriving travelers is recommended, together with 
effective communication with local clinicians and more ef-
fective disease control measures in the community.
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